Federal Communications Law
Journal
Volume 61

Issue 3

Article 9

6-2009

The Never-Ending Limits of § 230: Extending ISP Immunity to the
Sexual Exploitation of Children
Katy Noeth
Indiana University Maurer School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Communications Law Commons, Internet Law Commons,
Juvenile Law Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
Noeth, Katy (2009) "The Never-Ending Limits of § 230: Extending ISP Immunity to the Sexual Exploitation
of Children," Federal Communications Law Journal: Vol. 61 : Iss. 3 , Article 9.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj/vol61/iss3/9

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Federal
Communications Law Journal by an authorized editor of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information,
please contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

The Never-Ending Limits of § 230:
Extending ISP Immunity to the Sexual
Exploitation of Children
Katy Noeth*
1.

SECTION 230 IMMUNITY ...........................................................

Congress's Intent in Enacting§ 230 ................................
The Seminal § 230 Case and Its EnduringEffects ...........
II. A CASE FOR CHANGING THE § 230 LEGAL REGIME TO
PROTECT M INORS ONLINE .......................................................
A.
The CurrentState of the Law Under § 230......................
B. A Multi-FacetedApproach ..............................................
III. FOUR WAYS TO CURB THE EXTENSION OF § 230 IMMUNITY
A.
B.

766

768
768
770
770
772

IN CASES WHERE ISPS KNOWINGLY ALLOW THE SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN ON THEIR SITES .........................

A.
B.

C.

773
A CongressionalAmendment to § 230 ............................. 773
Courts Should Distinguish Zeran and Refuse to Apply
its Defamation Rationale to Child Sexual Exploitation
Claims ..............................................................................
773
Courts Should Recognize that Extending Immunity to
ISPs in Child Sexual Exploitation Cases Produces a
Result that is Inconsistent with the Original Policy
Objectives of Congress in Enacting§ 230 ....................... 775
1. Imposing the Proposed Liability Will Not Squelch
the Growth of the Internet or Create Disincentives
for Its Developm ent .................................................
776

* J.D., 2009, Indiana University Maurer School of Law-Bloomington; B.A. History
2005, Indiana University.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 61

2.

Imposing the Proposed Liability Will Not Result
in an Infeasible Policing of the Internet ..................
778
3.
Imposing the Proposed Liability Will Not
Inundate the ISPs with Lawsuits .......................
779
D. Courts Should Not Extend § 230 Immunity to a Civil
Claim Based on a Violation of§ 2252A ......................
781
1. The Exception to § 230 Immunity Provided by §
230(e)(1) and Title 18 U.S.C. § 2252A ...................
781
2.
Plaintiffs' Unsuccessful Attempt in Doe v. Bates
to Bring a Civil Claim Under § 230 Based on an
Alleged Violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 2252A ........
782
IV . CONCLUSION ...........................................
784
I. SECTION 230 IMMUNITY
Minors are not safe on the Internet under the current legal regime.
Society's obligation to protect its children from sexual predators, wherever
they operate,' has been hindered by recent judicial determinations, which
have held that certain Internet sites are not liable for failing to protect
minors from sexual exploitation2 or assault.3 These judicial interpretations
have rendered Internet Service Providers (ISPs) virtually judgment proof
even when they knowingly allow the sexual exploitation of children on
their sites.
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) provides
immunity 4 to ISPs.5 It bars claims against ISPs based on the publication of
1. See, e.g., Michael D. Marin & Christopher V. Popov, Doe v. MySpace, Inc.:
Liabilityfor Third PartyContent on SocialNetworking Sites, COMM. LAWYER, Spring 2007,
at 3, available at http://www.vinson-elkins.com/uploadedFilesNEsite/Resources/MarinPopov.pdf.
2. See Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91, 2006 WL 3813758 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006).
3. See Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843 (W.D. Tex. 2007), affd, 528 F.3d
413 (5th Cir. 2008).
4. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000). The statute provides: "Treatment of publisher or
speaker[:] No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider."
§ 230(c)(1).
5. Courts have considered ISPs to be an interactive computer service. See Doe v.
MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d at 848 (explaining that ISP is defined as a Web site that
"functions as an intermediary by providing a forum for the exchange of information
between third party users"). In addition, § 230(0(2) provides:
Interactive computer service[:] The term "interactive computer service" means
any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or
enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such
systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.
§ 230(0(2); see also § 230(0(3) ("Information content provider[:] The term 'information
content provider' means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the
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third-party content. Defendants are immune from liability from state law
claims if:
(1) [They are] a "provider or user of an interactive computer service";
(2) the claim is based on "information provided by another information
content provider"; and (3) the claim would
6 treat [the Defendants] "as
publisher or speaker" of that information.
There is, however, an exception to this immunity given in § 230(e). 7 It
provides: "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to impair the
enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this Act, chapter 71 (relating to
obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of title 18,
United States Code, or any other Federal criminal statute. 8
If civil liability is imposed on Web sites such as Yahoo!, § 230
immunity provides that it must be imposed on the individual posters of
content. 9 Courts have typically held that § 230 grants ISPs complete
immunity from both publisher and distributor liability.'0 As a result, ISPs
including Web sites such as Yahoo!, Google, and MySpace enjoy a
"robust" immunity from civil liability under § 230 of the CDA." The
extension of CDA immunity under § 230 in recent judicial decisions has
served to protect ISPs at the expense of the safety of minors. Courts have
missed an opportunity to finally curb the extension of § 230 immunity, and
instead, further extended immunity to ISPs who knowingly violate criminal
law. As a result, the so-called "decency act" has "been transformed from an
appropriate shield into a sword of harm and extreme danger which places
technology buzz words and economic
considerations above the safety and
'2
people."'
our
of
welfare
general
Under this Note's proposed changes, ISPs such as Yahoo! should be
held liable for knowingly allowing the sexual exploitation of children on
their sites. This Note will discuss the background of § 230 immunity and
several recent judicial developments. It will then explain why a change to
the current law is needed and how to effectuate such a change.
creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other
interactive computer service.").
6. Universal Comm. Sys. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting §

230).
7. The CDA grants immunity from all civil liability with certain exceptions expressly
laid out in the statute: (1) federal criminal law, (2) intellectual property law, (3) state law
that is consistent with this section, and (4) the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
8. § 230(e)(1).
9. See David V. Richards, Posting Personal Information on the Internet: A Case for
Changing the Legal Regime Createdby § 230 of the CommunicationsDecency Act, 85 TEx.

L. REv.
10.
11.
12.

1321, 1337 (2007) (offering six alternative solutions to § 230 immunity).
See id.
at 1336.
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003).
Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1019 (Fla. 2001) (Lewis, J. dissenting).
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Congress 's Intent in Enacting § 230

.The legislative purpose behind enacting § 230 in 1996 was to ensure
that the threat of litigation would not discourage the growth and
development of the Internet and other online services.' 3 The legislative
history surrounding Congress's creation of § 230 reflects the desire to
protect online intermediaries from liability for unlawful third-party
content.' 4 Congress considered the weight of the speech interests
implicated and chose to immunize service providers to avoid any such
restrictive effect.' 5 Congress found that:
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive
computer services available to individual Americans represent an
extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and
informational resources to our citizens.
(2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the
information that they receive, as well as the potential for even greater
control in the future as technology develops.
(3) The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum
for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for
cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have
flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of
government regulation.
(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for16a
variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services.
Congress reasoned that any liability would threaten development of
the online industry as a medium for new forms of mass communication and
would simultaneously create disincentives for self-regulation by service
providers. 17 Congress enacted § 230 to prevent this unwanted result.

B.

The Seminal § 230 Case andIts EnduringEffects

The seminal case on § 230 immunity is Zeran v. America Online,
Inc. The case arose when America Online (AOL) failed to remove a
defamatory posting on its site. 19 The plaintiff, Zeran, contended that once
he had notified AOL of the defamatory posting, AOL had a "duty to
remove the defamatory posting promptly, to notify its subscribers of the
message's false nature, and to effectively screen future defamatory
18

13. See § 230(b)(1), (2), (4).
14. See Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91, 2006 WL 3813758 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006).
15. See Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1122-24 (quoting Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d
327 (4th Cir. 1997)).

16. See § 230(a).
17. See id.
18. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).

19. Seeid. at327.
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material., 20 The Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals disagreed with Zeran and
21
found that § 230 barred his claim.
The court held that § 230 "creates a federal immunity to any cause of
action that would make service providers liable for information originating
with a third-party user of the service. ' 22 It explained that, "both the
negligent communication of a defamatory statement and the failure to
remove such a statement when first communicated by another party ...
constitute publication." 23 In so finding, the Fourth Circuit extended § 230
immunity to ISPs (here, AOL) that failed to withdraw content despite
having prior notice of the content's unlawful nature.24 The court reasoned
that the decision to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter content is a
traditional editorial function of a publisher, the exercise of which cannot be
a basis for liability under the CDA.25
This rationale has endured and has played a critical role in courts'
decisions in subsequent CDA cases. Courts have extended the Zeran
court's rationale for granting immunity to non-defamation claims related to
the publication of third-party content and the harms resulting from such
publication.2 6 As a result of these courts' decisions, ISPs have "no
obligation to remove tortious materials, to prevent the reposting of
objectionable materials, or to help victims track down the primary
wrongdoers. 27 The effect of these expansive judicial interpretations of §
230 "has been the emergence of a comprehensive immunity from suit for
ISPs so long as the suits are based on content not authored by the ISP. ' 28 In
sum, the "judiciary's inflated interpretation of § 230 has created a legal
environment that is ideal for injury and difficult for redress." 29 The end
result is that courts have expanded § 230 to immunize ISPs from virtually
every tort action.30

20. Id. at 330.
21. Id.at 335.
22. Id.at 330.
23. Id. at 332.
24. Id.at 332-33.
25. Id. at 330.
26. See, e.g., Ben Ezra, Wienstein & Co., Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986
(10th Cir. 2000).
27. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80 WASH. L.
REV. 335, 341 (2005).
28. Paul Ehrlich, Communications Decency Act § 230, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.

401, 402, 406-11 (2002).
29. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 27, at 341.
30. See id.at 342-43.
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II. A CASE FOR CHANGING THE § 230 LEGAL REGIME TO
PROTECT MINORS ONLINE
The CurrentState of the Law Under§ 230
The trend of broadening § 230 immunity continues in a new line of
cases. The heart of the plaintiffs' claims in each case is the protection of
minors.3 1 Protecting ISPs' freedom on the Internet has reached a high point
with several recent court decisions, each finding that § 230 shields an ISP
from civil liability regardless of whether it attempted to remove the
offending material or whether it knew the material existed on its site.32
In December 2006, U.S. District Judge David Folsom decided the
case Doe v. Bates,33 consistent with Magistrate Judge Caroline Craven's
recommendation. The decision extended the immunity of § 230 so that
Yahoo! could not be sued for knowingly profiting from a site where
members exchanged sexually explicit photos of minors.34 In this case, a
young boy's photographs were featured on an illegal pornography egroup 35 called Candyman that was hosted and operated by Yahoo!. 36 The
Candyman e-group allowed members to exchange messages and was "a
forum for sharing, posting, e-mailing, and transmitting hard-core, illegal
child pornography., 37 The plaintiffs (the parents of the child) alleged that
Yahoo! knowingly hosted illegal child pornography on its e-group and they
contended that it should have prevented, removed, and/or blocked the
illegal child pornography from its Web site.38
Magistrate Judge Craven found, and Judge Folsom agreed, that
Yahoo! knew or had reason to know about the illegal nature of its content
because: "(1) the site was in an adult entertainment subcategory, (2) its
introductory web page expressly stated that the group was for people who
'love kids,' and (3) any type of message, picture, or video could be posted
A.

31. See Recent Cases, Internet Law - Communications Decency Act - Texas District
Court Extends § 230 Immunity to Social Networking Sites. - Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F.
Supp. 2d 843 (W.D. Tex. 2007), 121 HARV. L. REV. 930 (2008) [hereinafter InternetLaw Communications Decency Act].
32. See Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91, 2006 WL 3813758 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006);
see also Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843 (W.D. Tex. 2007).
33. No. 5:05-CV-91, 2006 WL 3813758 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006).
34. See id. at *3.
35. E-groups are topic-specific forums which allow, encourage, and facilitate e-group
members to engage in discussions, share photographs and files, plan events, exchange ideas
and information, and nurture interests and activities. See id. at *1.
36. Id. at *5 (Craven, Mag. J., Report and Recommendation).
37. Id (Craven, Mag. J., Report and Recommendation).
38. See id. at *3-4. Plaintiffs filed a civil suit against Yahoo! claiming civil damages
under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A for negligence, negligence per se, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and civil conspiracy for allegedly allowing the
trafficking of illegal child pornography. See id. at *1.
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on the site." 39 Judge Folsom ruled that § 230 grants ISPs immunity from all
private civil liability regardless of their knowledge of the content of an
illegal site or whether they profit from the site, reasoning that this type of
litigation would have an "obvious chilling effect" on the Internet.4° Judge
Folsom explained that, "[w]hile the facts of a child pornography case such
as this one may be highly offensive, Congress has decided that the parties
to be punished and deterred are not the Internet service providers but rather
those who created and posted the illegal material." 4'
Following this rationale, the Western District of Texas Court of
Appeals, in Doe v. MySpace, Inc.,42 cited Doe v. Bates in holding that § 230
immunized the social networking site MySpace from claims involving the
sexual assault of a fourteen-year-old girl who met her attacker through the
Web site. In Doe v. MySpace, Inc., Julie Doe created a profile on MySpace
when she was thirteen years old.4 3 When she was fourteen, Pete Solis,
44
nineteen years old, initiated contact with her through MySpace.
Thereafter, she provided Solis with her contact information and they
arranged to meet for a date. On the date, Pete Solis sexually assaulted Julie
Doe.45 U.S. District Court Judge Sparks dismissed the case under §46230
because it was "directed toward MySpace in its capacity as a publisher.
Subsequent to the Doe v. MySpace, Inc. decision, the Northern
District Court of Appeals of Ohio followed this same line of reasoning in
applying immunity to ISPs, even when the suit was not based on their
capacity as publisher. In Doe v. SexSearch.com, 47 the plaintiff alleged that
he mistakenly had sex with a minor he had met through the online dating
service because the minor portrayed herself as an adult. At issue was the
"fact that a minor was on the SexSearch website, and not, the content of the
minor's profile." 4 Instead of evaluating the claim as pled, the court
followed the example of Doe v. MySpace, Inc. and concluded that the
plaintiffs were simply attempting to plead around the CDA.49 The court
explained,

39. Id. at *6, (Craven, Mag. J., Report and Recommendation) (emphasis added).
40. Id. at *4 (quoting Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997)).

41. Id.
42. 474 F. Supp. 2d 843 (W.D. Tex. 2007).
43. Id.at 846. Although fourteen is the minimum age required by MySpace to use its
services, Julie Doe lied about her age and represented that she was eighteen years old. Id.at
846, 846 n.3.
44. Id. at 846.

45. Id.
46. Id.at 849.
47. 502 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
48. Id.at 727.

49. Id.
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[i]n the present action, Plaintiff attempts to do the same thing as the
plaintiffs in Doe v. MySpace....

At the end of the day, however, Plaintiff is seeking to hold SexSearch
liable for its publication of third-party content and harms flowing from
the dissemination of that content.
The court found that, because the plaintiffis claims all hinged on
SexSearch's failure to remove the girl's profile or failure to prevent her
assaulter from communicating with her, their claims were barred under §
230."'
These three decisions have begun to lead § 230 jurisprudence down a
slippery slope. Defendants have succeeded thus far in these cases on the
argument that ISPs cannot be held liable on any state or federal claim
which would render that service liable for content provided by third
parties. 52 Each of these three cases offers similar rationales for extending
immunity to the ISPs in cases involving sexual predators: (1) the plaintiffs'
claims that the ISPs failed to react properly to discovering the sexual
predators on their sites is analogous to the ISPs in Zeran discovering the
defamatory postings, and so the reasoning in extending immunity to those
ISPs is applicable; and (2) from a policy standpoint, it would create an
"impossible burden" on the ISPs to act in these situations, and Congress, in
passing § 230, intended that ISPs not bear such a burden. 3 Several other
suits have been filed by parents accusing MySpace of "failing to prevent
pedophiles from using the site to make contact with -- and ultimately
molest -- their children. 5 4 Based on the current condition of the law, it is
likely that these claims will fail.
B.

A Multi-FacetedApproach
There are several ways to remedy the current trend of decisions and
cases, and to comply with both the clear language of § 230 and the
legislative intent of Congress in providing ISPs with immunity. Scholars
have suggested a variety of ideas for reforming or repealing § 230
immunity." The best approach entails a multi-faceted process.
This Note will focus on four solutions to prevent future courts from
following the precedent established by Doe v. Bates, Doe v. MySpace, Inc.,
and Doe v. SexSearch.com. Section 230 should be amended to reflect
50. Id.
51. Id.at 727-28.
52. See, e.g., id. at 726.
53. See Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 848 (W.D. Tex. 2007); see also
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997).

54. Annotation, Court Finds No Room for Suit Against MySpace Over Sexual Assault,
Doe v. MySpace, 24 ANDREWS COMPUTER & INTERNET LrrIG. REP. 2 (2007).
55. See Richards, supra note 9, at 1344-45.
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contemporary developments on the Internet to impose civil liability upon
ISPs that knowingly allow the sexual exploitation of children on their sites.
In the meantime, however, courts should intervene to mitigate the potential
harm of continuing down the path of protecting sexual predators by doing
three things. First, future courts should distinguish Zeran and refuse to
apply its defamation rationale to child sexual exploitation claims. Second,
courts should refuse to extend the immunity that ISPs attempt to hide
behind in child sexual exploitation claims because such immunity does not
further congressional intent behind § 230. Third, courts should recognize
an exception to immunity and impose liability upon ISPs when they
knowingly receive and/or distribute child pornography on their sites under
§ 230(e)(1).

III. FOUR WAYS TO CURB THE EXTENSION OF § 230 IMMUNITY
IN CASES WHERE ISPs KNOWINGLY ALLOW THE SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN ON THEIR SITES
A.

A CongressionalAmendment to § 230

The most straightforward approach to prevent decisions similar to
Doe v. Bates, is a congressional amendment. The language of § 230 should
be changed to reflect contemporary developments on the Internet. To that
end, I propose the following simple addition to § 230: Nothing in this
Section shall be construed to grant an interactive computer service
immunityfrom civil claims arisingunder Chapter110 where the interactive
computer service knowingly received or distributedchildpornography.
Although federal legislators should amend the CDA to account for the
changing nature of interactive Web sites, "the speed of the Internet's
development outpaces that of congressional legislation." 56 Courts should
use common sense and face the realities of the current state of affairs in
making decisions in order to clarify the legal landscape for ISPs.
B. Courts Should DistinguishZeran and Refuse to Apply its
Defamation Rationale to Child Sexual Exploitation Claims
The Zeran court "laid the groundwork" for the Doe v. Bates, Doe v.
MySpace, Inc., and Doe v. SexSearch.com decisions in holding that § 230
bars lawsuits seeking to hold ISPs liable for their exercise of a publisher's
traditional editorial functions-such as deciding whether to publish,
withdraw, postpone, or alter content.5 7 The judges in Doe v. Bates, Doe v.
MySpace, Inc., and Doe v. SexSearch.com similarly refused to hold the
56. Internet Law - Communications Decency Act, supranote 31, at 936.
57. Roxanne E. Christ & Jeanne S. Berges, Social Networking Sites: To Monitor or Not
to Monitor Users and Their Content?, 19 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 13, 14 (2007).
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ISPs liable for failing to police their sites for harmful third-party provided
content. These decisions demonstrate the willingness of courts to extend §
230 immunity from defamation suits to child sexual exploitation claims,
even when it enables sexual predators to prey on minors. The effect of
these decisions is that, by applying the rationale of Zeran, ISPs may have
knowledge and warning about the existence of child pornography and/or
sexual predators using their sites, yet continue to enjoy complete immunity
from civil suits under § 230.
In reaching his decision in Doe v. Bates, Judge Folsom refused to
draw a distinction between a child sexual exploitation claim and a typical
defamation claim. He held Yahoo! to be immune from liability under § 230
because it played no role in the creation or development of the images. 58
Yahoo! would be held immune even if it placed advertising on the Web site
or modified or enlarged the photographs.59 As Magistrate Craven
explained, "[c]hild pornography obviously is intolerable, but civil
immunity for interactive service providers does not constitute 'tolerance' of
child pornography any more than civil immunity from the numerous other
forms of harmful content that third parties may create constitutes approval
of that content." 60 The effect of this analogizing of "numerous other forms
of harmful content" (here, pornography) to "defamation" was to hold the
difference between child pornography and defamation irrelevant for
61
purposes of § 230 immunity.
Judge Sparks, in Doe v. MySpace, Inc., cited Bates in supporting his
conclusion that the plaintiffs' claims were within the purview of § 230.62
He analogized the plaintiffs' claims to the claims in Zeran.63 Judge Sparks
explained that because MySpace "failed to react appropriately" when it
knew that sexual predators were using its service to communicate with
minors, and thus "can be analogized to Zeran's claims that AOL failed to
act quickly enough to remove the ads and to prevent the posting of
additional ads after AOL was on notice that the content was false.'6 4 Judge
Sparks was not persuaded by the plaintiffs' argument that their case was
not based on MySpace's posting of third-party content, but rather on
MySpace's failure to institute safety measures to protect minors.65
58. Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91, 2006 WL 3813758, at *4-5 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27,
2006).
59. See Christ and Burges, supranote 57, at 14-15.
60. Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91, 2006 WL 3813758 at *22 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006)
(Craven, Mag. J., Report and Recommendation).
61. Id.
62. Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 849 (W.D. Tex. 2007).
63. Id. at 848-49.
64. Id. at 848.

65. Id.
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The facts, policy considerations, and practical implications of the
holding and rationale of Zeran-a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals case
decided in 1997 shortly after the CDA was enacted-are readily
distinguishable from those of Doe v. Bates, Doe v. MySpace, Inc., and Doe
v. SexSearch.com.66 Zeran's holding does not necessitate the courts'
holdings in Doe v. Bates, Doe v. MySpace, Inc., and Doe v. SexSearch.com
that the ISPs are immune from liability for knowingly receiving and/or
distributing forms of illegal child sexual exploitation on their Web sites.
Even if-as Judge Folsom and Judge Sparks posit 67-a

publisher's role is

legally identical in the face of child pornography and defamatory
statements, policy considerations should mandate a distinction between
Zeran's defamation claim and child sexual exploitation claims. The court in
Zeran reached its decision through a careful analysis of the CDA's goals,
which are much closer to being realized in 2009 than they were in 1997.68
This Note does not mean to suggest that the reasoning of Zeran is
unpersuasive. Courts deciding similar cases in the future, however, should
acknowledge and consider these distinctions when ruling on child sexual
exploitation claims.
C. Courts Should Recognize that Extending Immunity to ISPs in
ChildSexual Exploitation Cases Produces a Result that is
Inconsistent with the OriginalPolicy Objectives of Congress in
Enacting § 230
The policy rationales used by courts to justify the continued
expansion of § 230 immunity do not compel an extension of the immunity
to ISPs who knowingly act as publishers or distributors of information that
results in the sexual exploitation of children. The suggestion that ISPs
should be held civilly liable for their roles as distributors and producers has
faced criticism, which stems from the fact that § 230 immunity serves to
69
incentivize creation and encourage freedom of expression on the Internet.
It has been argued that imposing liability upon ISPs would squelch the
growth of the Internet, would call for infeasible "policing" of the ISPs'
Web sites, and would create an overload of lawsuits against ISPs-whom
they claim are not in the best position to protect minors. 70 These arguments
66. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Anthony Ciolli,
ChillingEffects: The Communications Decency Act andthe Online Marketplace ofIdeas, 63
U. MIAMI L. REv. 137, 148 (2008).
67. See generally, Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91, 2006 WL 3813758 (E.D. Tex. Dec.
27, 2006); see also Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843 (W.D. Tex. 2007).
68. See infraPart Ill.C.1.
69. See Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91, 2006 WL 3813758 at *4 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27,
2006).
70. See id.
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have proven to be persuasive in the general context of imposing liability on
ISPs. However, Congress's goals of freedom and expansion of the Internet
are not served by allowing ISPs to knowingly allow and profit from the
sexual exploitation of children on their Web sites. Carving out a narrow
exception under § 230 to allow a small range of claims against ISPsholding them liable when they knowingly allow the sexual exploitation of
children on their sites-will not undermine congressional intent.
Congress could not have intended to give interactive Web sites the
freedom to act without any restraints. 7' The inclusive immunity extended
by courts to allow ISPs to go unchecked by the law in this area surely was
not what Congress had in mind when it expressed its intent to further the
development of the Internet.7 2 Judge Lewis accurately summarized the
illogicality of this extension:
the carefully crafted statute at issue, undergirded by a clear legislative
history, does not reflect an intent to totally exonerate and insulate an
ISP from responsibility where ... it is alleged that an ISP has acted as
a knowing distributor of material leading to the purchase, sale,
expansion and advancement of child pornography, after having been
given actual notice of the particular activity, by taking absolutely no
steps to curtail continued dissemination of the information by its
specifically identified customer, when it had the right and power to do
SO.73

An examination of each of the criticisms of imposing liability reveals
why they are unpersuasive in the context of extending immunity to ISPs
who knowingly allow the sexual exploitation of children on their Web
sites.
1. Imposing the Proposed Liability Will Not Squelch the Growth
of the Internet or Create Disincentives for Its Development
The relative concerns of the development of the Internet and the
increase of child pornography have shifted since § 230's passing. The
congressional goal of promoting the development of the Internet has been
accomplished to a significant extent. Technological advances have resulted
in a drastically advanced cyber world from the one that existed when the
CDA was passed in 1996. The landscape and modem realities of the
Internet have changed significantly. Internet sites are flourishing,74 and the
71. See Internet Law - CommunicationsDecency Act, supra note 31.
72. See Matthew J. Jeweler, The Communications Decency Act of 1996: Why § 230 is
Outdated and Publisher Liability for Defamation Should Be Reinstated Against Internet

Service Providers,8 U. PrrT. J. L. & POL'Y 3 (2008) (arguing that Web site operators should
no longer be able to benefit from an outdated law that was meant to promote the growth of
the Internet).
73. Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1019 (Fla. 2000) (Lewis, J., dissenting).
74. See Richards, supra note 9, at 1323.
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Internet now serves almost 1.5 billion people.75 Internet usage increased
129.6% in North America alone
from 2000 until 2008, and 305.5%
76
throughout the rest of the world.
The task of curbing the explosion of child pornography on the
Internet, on the other hand, has not yet been accomplished. The Department
of Justice (DOJ) has stated that "[t]he Internet has escalated the problem of
child pornography by increasing the amount of material available, the
efficiency of its distribution, and the ease of its accessibility. 77 The
interactivity and ease of information sharing on the Internet has increased
the quantity of child pornography available because it "permits access to
vast quantities of pornographic images from around the world[,] makes
pornography instantly available at any time or place[, and] allows
pornography to be accessed (apparently) anonymously and privately., 78 It
is difficult to estimate precisely the extent of Internet child pornography,
but according to the DOJ, "all of the available evidence points to it being a
major and growing problem., 79 Available statistics demonstrate the extent
of the problem of child pornography on the Internet. For example, the
number of Internet child pornography images has increased 1500% since
1988.80 Child pornography has become a $3 billion-a-year industry,8' and
approximately twenty percent of all Internet pornography involves
children.82 According to the DOJ, at any one time it is estimated that there
are "more than one million pornographic images of children on the
Internet, with 200 new images posted daily., 83 It has also been reported by
the DOJ that "a single child pornography site received a million hits in a
month" and that "there are between 50,000 and 100,000 pedophiles
involved in organized pornography rings around the world, and that onethird of these operate from the United States." 84

75. World Internet Usage Statistics News and World Population
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
76. Id.

Stats,

77. RICHARD WORTLEY & STEPHEN SMALLBONE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET 8 (2006), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/ric/

Publications/e04062000.pdf.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 12.
80. Internet Child Porn Safety Call, BBC NEWS, Jan. 12, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/technology/3390813.stm.
81. CHILD WISE, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY & THE INTERNET, http://www.childwise.net/
downloads/Child Pomogprahy.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
82. Enough is Enough: Making the Internet Safer for Children and Families-Statistics,
http://www.enough.org/inside.php?tag=statistics (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
83. See WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 77 at 12 (internal citation omitted).
84. See id. at 12-13 (internal citations omitted).
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The rise of youth participation in social networking sites also makes
minors vulnerable to sexual predators. In 2007, MySpace was the most
visited Web site in the United States. Many of the site's users are minors.
On a monthly basis, nineteen percent of MySpace users are minors under
the age of seventeen. s6 The result of this rise in youth participation is that
"[a]s social networking websites target increasingly younger audiences, the
need for security will continue to increase. 8 7
Moreover, the imposition of civil penalties for knowingly receiving
and/or distributing materials that contribute to the sexual exploitation of
children will not create disincentives for Internet development because, for
this narrow range of claims, criminal disincentives are already in place.8
Disincentives will exist whether civil liability is possible or not. The
Plaintiffs correctly argued in Doe v. Bates that "[i]f the prospect of civil
liability provides a disincentive for engaging in child pornography over and
by the prospect of fines and jail time, then that is a
above that provided
89
good thing.,
2.
Imposing the Proposed Liability Will Not Result in an
Infeasible Policing of the Internet
A narrow exception-to impose liability upon an ISP when it
knowingly allows the sexual exploitation of children on its site-will not
result in prohibitive amounts of monitoring nor will it inhibit
communication over the Internet. The "policing" of the Internet envisioned
by the court in Zeran (had civil liability been imposed on ISPs in that case)
would not materialize by imposing liability on ISPs in this narrow range of
cases relating to ISPs that knowingly allow the sexual exploitation of
children on their Web sites. The court in Zeran stated that,
[t]he amount of information communicated via interactive computer
services is... staggering. The specter of tort liability in an area of such
prolific speech would have an obvious chilling effect. It would be
to screen each of their millions of
impossible for service providers
90
postings for possible problems.
85. Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 845 (W.D. Tex. 2007).
86. Julia Angwin & Brian Steinberg, News Corp. Goal: Make MySpace Safer for
Teens, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2006, at BI.
87. See Internet Law - Communications Decency Act, supra note 31, at 934. The
article further noted, "[t]he Internet now provides virtual worlds in which children as
young as thirteen can meet complete strangers online and quickly proceed to become
friends, get 'married,' and even raise virtual children." Id.at 937.
88. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2008).
89. Plaintiff's Objections to Report and Recommendation by Magistrate Judge Craven
at *17, Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91, 2006 WL 3813758 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006)
[hereinafter Plaintiff's Objections, Doe v. Bates], availableat 2006 WL 813809.
90. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
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That same reasoning-that imposing civil liability on ISPs would
create an impossible burden-prevailed in the Doe v. Bates and Doe v.
MySpace, Inc. cases. Judge Folsom, in Doe v. Bates, found that to require
ISPs to screen for potentially obscene materials, or even to respond to
notices of such materials, would not be feasible because the sheer number
91
of postings would create an "impossible burden" on the provider.
Similarly, Judge Sparks, in Doe v. MySpace, Inc., reasoned that,
[t]o impose a duty under these circumstances for MySpace to confirm
or determine the age of each applicant, with liability resulting from
negligence in performing or not performing that duty, would of course
stop MySpace's business in its tracks and close this avenue of
which Congress in its wisdom has decided to
communication,
92
protect.

Contrary to the assertions of Judges Folsom and Sparks, the burden
imposed upon ISPs would be modest if they were only held liable for
knowingly allowing the sexual exploitation of children on their Web sites.
The imposition of liability in cases involving ISPs that knowingly allow the
sexual exploitation of children on their Web sites, 93 would not result in the
impractical burden imposed upon ISPs in the traditional defamation cases.
A duty to monitor everything that comes across an ISP's Web site may in
fact inhibit the flow of communication over the Internet. However,
imposing the "knowingly" standard of fault in child sexual exploitation
cases will eliminate the duty to monitor, and a plaintiff bringing this type of
suit would need to prove, as an element of his or her claim, that the ISP
knew about the child sexual exploitation.
Imposing the Proposed Liability Will Not Inundate the ISPs
3.
with Lawsuits
Imposing civil liability for knowingly receiving and/or distributing
child sexual exploitation materials is also not likely to inhibit the growth of
the Internet due to an increase in related litigation. Magistrate Judge
Craven, in explaining her extension of § 230 immunity in Doe v. Bates,
argued that "[i]f civil liability were possible, the incentive to bring a civil
claim for the settlement value could be immense." 94 Professors Doug
Lichtman and Eric Posner point out that a court makes a mistake "when it
assumes that a mere accusation would be sufficient to trigger ISP
91. Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91, 2006 WL 3813758 at *4 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006)
(quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333).
92. See Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 851 (W.D. Tex. 2007).
93. The plaintiffs in Doe v. Bates argued that "[i]t certainly is not impossible for
Yahoo! to comply with federal laws prohibiting the knowing receipt and distribution of
child pornography." Plaintiff's Objections, Doe v. Bates, supra note 89, at *9.
94. Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91, 2006 WL 3813758 at *22 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006)
(Craven, Mag. J., Report and Recommendation).
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liability." 9 They explain that "[i]n a more familiar setting, that sounds
absurd. 96 For example, they argue, it would be ludicrous to say that a court
would really "hold a large bookseller accountable for defamation solely
because a random patron informed the cashier that a particular title
contained an unlawful communication. ' If liability were imposed, ISPs
would only be required not to knowingly allow the sexual exploitation of
children on their Web sites, which would mean that "an ISP would not be
required to do anything in cases where the only warning was an isolated
8 The requirement for
accusation ...9"98
citizens and other entities to comply
with the law has not been lessened because of the threat of litigation.
Similarly, in the context of child sexual exploitation, the threat of litigation
should not allow ISPs to escape compliance with the law.
Additionally, ISPs are in a strong position to prevent the exploitation
of minors on the Internet. 99 Professors Lichtman and Posner point out that §
230 specifically encourages ISPs to voluntarily address inappropriate
action l°° Section 230 immunizes ISPs from liability for "any action
voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of
material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether
or not such material is constitutionally protected."'' ° Professors Lichtman
and Posner note that the chain of liability often knows no bounds and they
assert that, "as a practical matter the chain of liability cannot extend
forever, and thus in the end choices must be made as to which entities are
best positioned to support enforcement of the law."' 0 2 Accordingly, the
chain of liability should extend to ISPs in the case of knowingly allowing
child sexual exploitation to occur on their sites because they are in a strong
position to support enforcement of the law.

95. Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service ProvidersAccountable, 14
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 221, 252-53 (2006).

96. Id. at 253.
97. Id.
98. Id.at 252-53.
99. Professors Lichtman and Posner argue that ISPs "are in a good position to reduce
the number and severity of bad acts online." Id.at 223. When faced with the growing
problem of cyber-insecurity, they argue, "ISPs should be called into the service of the law."
Id.at 224.
100. Id.at 224. Specifically, Lichtman and Posner argue that the language of § 230 itself
supports the idea that ISPs are in a good position to reduce the number and severity of bad
acts because the statute "encourages Intemet service providers to address inappropriate
content through voluntary private action." Id.at 223-24.
101. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (2000).
102. Lichtman & Posner, supra note 95, at 257.
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D. Courts Should Not Extend § 230 Immunity to a Civil Claim
Based on a Violation of§ 2252A
1. The Exception to § 230 Immunity Provided by § 230(e)(1) and
Title 18 U.S.C. § 2252A
Future courts should refuse to continue granting civil immunity to
willful violators of a federal crime. ISPs such as Yahoo!, Google, and
MySpace should not enjoy immunity under § 230 for civil claims arising
out of Chapter 110 of Title 18 (relating to the sexual exploitation of
children). Congress expressly stated in passing § 230(e) that § 230
immunity shall not affect Chapter 110 of Title 18, or any other federal
criminal statute. 0 3 Title 18 U.S.C. § 2252A is plainly the type of statute
imagined by Congress which would provide such an exception to § 230
immunity.

Section 2252A is a federal statute that makes it a crime to knowingly
distribute child pornography.

°4

It prohibits any person from knowingly

receiving, shipping, transporting, distributing, or possessing, through any
means of interstate commerce-including by computer-visual depictions
4 6
05
of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. It is a criminal offense'
under § 2252A to have actual knowledge-such as repeated complaints
that the service for which one is responsible is being used as the medium
10 7
for consumption of child pornography-and then to do nothing about it.

Congress, in passing § 2252A, appears to have attempted to prevent the
widespread

transmission

of child pornography

over the

Internet.

Consequently, it is inconsistent with the expressed intent of Congress to bar
civil actions and grant ISPs immunity when they are negligent to the point
of committing a criminal offense by allowing this type of blatantly illegal
material on their sites.

Section 230(e)(1) demonstrates that Congress intended that there be
an exception to immunity in cases where ISPs knowingly allow the sexual

exploitation of children on their sites. It follows that a civil claim based on
an alleged violation of § 2252A should be recognized as falling within the

exception for "enforcement" of a "federal criminal statute."' 0 8

103. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1).

104. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2000).
105. § 2252A(a).
106. § 2252A(b). Section 2252A(f) also contains a provision for a private "civil remedy"
for anyone aggrieved by a violation of the statute which further reveals Congress's intent to
stop the widespread transmission of child pornography. § 2252A(f).
107. § 2252A(a)(2).
108. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1).
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2.
Plaintiffs' Unsuccessful Attempt in Doe v. Bates to Bring a
Civil Claim Under § 230 Based on an Alleged Violation of Title 18
U.S.C. § 2252A
The plaintiffs in Doe v. Bates proposed this approach and asserted
that the exception under § 230(e)(1) should allow a civil suit to be brought
based on alleged criminal acts. 1°9 They contended that their claim should
not be barred by § 230 because they were seeking judgment under a
provision of a criminal statute, § 2252A." 0 They argued that when Yahoo!
decided to profit from its distribution of a Web site containing child
pornography, it became a perpetrator as well."' To support their claim, the
plaintiffs in Doe v. Bates provided an illustrative example of the seemingly
prejudicial results of not recognizing such an exception to § 230 immunity
under § 230(e)(1):
Mr. Black, a hypothetical ordinary "user" of the Internet, can receive
on his computer child pornography from his hypothetical friend Mr.
Brown who took numerous illegal pictures of children. Mr. Black
looks at the images (photos) and determines that they are indeed child
pornography. Being an entrepreneur, Mr. Black decides to sell the
photos over the Internet and not share any of the profits with Mr.
Brown. Amazingly, he makes millions until the FBI stops the conduct.
Mr. Black and Mr. Brown ultimately go to jail for a very long time for
violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252A. Since 2252A also provides for civil
remedies, the victims sue both Mr. Brown and Mr. Black. Though both
are in jail, only Mr. Brown, the "content provider", can be liable in a
civil action. Since Mr. Black is only a "user" of the Internet - not the
content provider - he 2is immune from civil liability despite his
reprehensible conduct.1
Doe v. Bates presented an issue of first impression to decide whether
§ 230 immunity should extend to a civil claim based on an alleged violation
of § 2252A. Magistrate Judge Craven found that an intentional violation of
criminal law is not an exception to immunity under § 230(e)(1) based on
his finding that § 230(e)(1) only applies to criminal penalties of § 2252A." 3
She reasoned that § 230(e)(1) does not encompass civil claims because of
the context of § 230(e)(1) and the common
definitions of three terms:
"criminal," "civil," and "enforcement."' 1 4

109. Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91, 2006 WL 3813758 at *20 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006)

(Craven, Mag. J., Report and Recommendation).
110. See id.
at *3.
111. Seeid.
112. Plaintiff's Objections, Doe v.Bates, supra note'89, at *3-4.
113. Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91, 2006 WL 3813758 at *20-22 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27,
2006) (Craven, Mag. J.,
Report and Recommendation).

114. Seeid. at*21.
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Section 230(e)(1) states that all sections of Chapter 110 of Title 18'
are to be "enforced."' 6 Magistrate Judge Craven confined the meaning of
"enforcement" to governmental actions. She says, "[i]n addition, Congress'
use of the word 'enforcement' in Section 230(e)(1) again confirms that the
exception refers to governmental action, not civil actions by a private
litigant."" 7 Magistrate Judge Craven provides the Black's Law Dictionary
definition for "criminal" '" 18 and "civil"'" 19 but does not provide the definition
for "enforce.' 120 Black's Law Dictionary defines the term "enforce" as
"[t]o give force or effect to (a law, etc.); to compel obedience to.' 12 ' The
definition is not limited in its construction to government enforcements.
Consistent with Magistrate Judge Craven's Report and
Recommendation and Judge Folsom's ruling, ISPs can now be criminally
prosecuted under § 2252A, but cannot be sued for civil remedies for that
same conduct. Section 230(e)(1) should not be limited in its applicability to
the criminal penalties of § 2252A. An alternative approach to interpreting
the statute-i.e., interpreting it to apply to all enforcements, not just penal
enforcements-would lead to a more logical result. Such a construction
would be consistent with congressional intent and the plain language of the
statute. From the standpoint of Congress, it makes little sense to subject
ISPs to fines and prison sentences as a means of addressing child
pornography, and then to say that "Congress nonetheless wanted to foster
expansion of the Internet by protecting Internet service providers from
attendant civil liability for their criminal conduct."' 22 If Congress had
intended to limit the meaning of § 230(e)(1), it could have used other
language, such as "criminal enforcement" or "penal enforcement."
Congress did not use such limiting language, and used instead, "[n]o effect
on criminal law.' 23
In finding Yahoo! immune from civil liability, the court read
230(c)(1) broadly. It then proceeded to read the § 230(e)(1) exception to
115. Defined as "Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of Children," § 2252A falls
within Chapter 110 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code.
116. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (2000).
117. Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91, 2006 WL 3813758 at *21 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006)
(Craven, Mag. J., Report and Recommendation).
118. Black's Law Dictionary defines "criminal" as "[clonnected with the administration
of penal justice." BLACK'S LAW DIcTnONARY 402 (8th ed. 2004).
119. Black's Law Dictionary defines "civil" as "[o]f or relating to private rights and
remedies that are sought by action or suit, as distinctfrom criminal proceedings." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 262 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added).
120. Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91, 2006 WL 3813758 at *21 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006)
(Craven, Mag. J., Report and Recommendation).
121. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 569(8th ed. 2004).
122. Plaintiff's Objections, Doe v. Bates, supra note 89, at *16.
123. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (2000).
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immunity narrowly. The result was an expansive interpretation that was not
compelled by the language of the CDA, and that was incompatible with
congressional intent and case law. If other courts continue 24 to follow this
line of reasoning, then ISPs may further enjoy a far-reaching immunity that
will allow the continued explosion of child pornography on the Internet.

IV. CONCLUSION
Minors are more susceptible to becoming victims of sexual predators
on the Internet because of an overly expansive interpretation of § 230
immunity. In 2009, the continued expansion of the Internet remains an
important goal, but such a goal does not require granting ISPs all-inclusive
civil immunity from conduct that amounts to a violation of federal criminal
law.
In order to curb the extension of § 230 immunity, several steps should
be taken. Section 230 should be amended to reflect contemporary
developments on the Internet and impose civil liability upon ISPs that
knowingly allow the sexual exploitation of children on their sites. Future
courts should recognize, in the meantime, that the policy and legal
justifications proffered do not support extending CDA immunity to ISPs
who knowingly permit the sexual exploitation of children on their Web
sites. Any of the proposed courses of action will be a step in the right
direction toward keeping
minors safe on the Internet; however, "[n]o
25
measure is a panacea."

124. See, e.g., Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843 (W.D. Tex. 2007); Doe v.
Sexsearch.com, 502 F.Supp.2d 719 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
125. Anne Barnard, MySpace Agrees to Lead Fight to Stop Sex Predators,N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 15, 2008, at B3 (quoting Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal).

